RESPONSIBILITY, POWER, AND THE PRESIDENT
By D.X. Liu
Introduction
Most will agree that the office of President of the United States of America is something in-between useless figurehead and omnipotent totalitarian. The distinction that must be drawn before assessing the amount of control the President has against the amount of responsibility attributed to that office is one of actual power versus mere influence. It is the position of this paper that the public generally holds the President decidedly responsible for both foreign affairs and the economy; while the President does receive due credit or opprobrium in foreign affairs per his* real power in that arena, he receives undue credit or opprobrium for the economy, his control over that field being limited to only oblique influence.
Presidential scholars suggest that the public has come to believe that "the man inside the White House" can do "something about everything."[1] American presidents "must partake in a presidency where actual powers of the institution do not meet the expectations and the responsibilities that many citizens have for the office."[2] Yet these expectations are often excessive and contradictory; the high expectations of the public for what should be done by a president, weighed against the low expectations for what can be done, always tends to push the probability of failure toward 100 percent.[3] This is what is called the "expectations gap," a phenomenon of public inconsistency that has had a negative impact on the modern presidency.[4] Thus established, the President will always carry great responsibility, as defined by general public perception, in both foreign affairs and the economy; it is the actual power that he has in these realms that determines the aptness of all the credit or opprobrium he may garner for its events.
*Throughout, owing to the deficiency of the English language, the male gender is justified historically but not prospectively when referring to a President, in order to avoid awkwardness of style. He, him, and his are not intended as exclusively masculine pronouns—they may refer to either sex or to both sexes.
Foreign Affairs
There is little in the Constitution that encourages presidential dominance of the foreign policy-making system.[5] Besides being commander-in-chief of all armed forces, constitutionally, the President has little power beyond the realm of diplomatic dialogue with foreign governments; when it comes to concrete issues like treaties, wars, and financial initiatives required for almost any executive action, it is Congress that wields the most power and the most responsibility.[6]
The State Department states that the Constitution creates different and important roles for the President and Congress in the making of foreign policy. The president makes foreign policy through: responses to foreign events, proposals for legislation, negotiation of international agreements, policy statements, policy implementation, and independent action.[7] Congress makes foreign policy through: resolutions and policy statements, legislative directives, legislative pressure, legislative restrictions/funding denials, informal advice, and congressional oversight.[8] This division of foreign policy powers creates a complex, unresolved relationship between the two branches that often overlaps and makes ambiguous who originates or finally determines foreign policy.[9]
In addition, "the roles and relative influence of the two branches in making foreign policy differ from time to time according to such factors as the personalities of the President and Members of Congress and the degree of consensus on policy."[10] Historically, then, scholars have cited "the period 1789-1829 as one of Presidential initiative; 1829-1898 as one of congressional supremacy, and 1899 through the immediate post World War II period as one of growing Presidential power."[11] The most recent period of congressional dominance of foreign policy began toward the end of the Vietnam War, only to have the pendulum swing back toward presidential dominance during the Reagan and Bush, Sr. Administrations, peaking once during Operation Desert Storm in Iraq,[12] and now at a peak again in the aftermath of September 11 and in the rumblings of another war with Iraq.
Thus, despite the President's seemingly meager supervisory role in the Constitution, responsibility and initiative in foreign affairs has naturally devolved on the President, because in matters of crisis or emergency, "Congress was too slow and contrary and the Supreme Court was bound by its procedures."[13] John F. Kennedy defined the President's responsibilities in foreign policy during his campaign in a speech on
It is now generally accepted that the President, and the executive office in general, dominates United States foreign affairs[15], that while American foreign policy is a "divided power," the "lion's share" falls usually to the President.[16] Even during times of peace, foreign policy has been uniquely important to the President; it is the arena that offers presidents "the greatest freedom to exercise their power and the best opportunity to affect policy personally. Important foreign affairs decisions often have been made by the president alone or during intimate consultations with a few trusted advisors."[17] Today, the President is the "chief
Some argue that this is due to the realities of the international system. In foreign affairs, "policy takes precedence over politics because the international system both severely limits the sensible choices a country can make and shapes the processes by which these decisions are reached."[19] Thus, the international system is relatively free of politics and partisanship and of quibbling with Congress. The foreign policy president enjoys independence, respect, and prestige that enable him to manage foreign affairs quite autonomously from domestic issues.[20]
The are four main differences between domestic and foreign policy that basically elevate the President to virtual omnipotence and relegate Congress to a position of "self-denying ordinance" in which they believe it is not part of their job to determine the nation's foreign policies: first, foreign policy often requires "fast action" that is more appropriate for executive than legislative decision-making; second, the President has far more power to commit resources and obtain information about foreign affairs; third, voters who know little about foreign policy "expect the president to act in foreign affairs" and will "reward him with their confidence" at the polls; and fourth, the interest group structure is weak, unstable, and thin with regard to foreign policy questions.[21] Thus, "to respond to external threats, the
This environment has allowed for what some term "the two presidencies," in which presidents can act abroad independently of domestic political issues.[23] The Two Presidency Theory supports the reality that the fundamental responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign policy remains in the hands of the President, operating independently of domestic politics; thus, Jimmy Carter could negotiate the SALT II agreement, reverse the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, cancel participation in the Olympics, impose a grain embargo, institute major increases in defense expenditures, facilitate Camp David, and attempt to rescue and finally negotiate the release of U.S. hostages in Iran, without getting re-elected; Ronald Reagan could continue defense build-up and negotiate the START and INF arms agreements while getting re-elected; and George Bush, Sr. could invade Panama, claim the democratization of Eastern Europe, oversee the collapse of the Soviet empire, end the Cold War, negotiate a new arms control agreement with Russia, arrange the first international peace conference in the Middle East, help settle conflicts in Cambodia and South Africa, and wage the Gulf War, without getting re-elected.[24]
However, others argue that the President is always subject to domestic politics, and that his power and his choices in the realm of foreign affairs are constantly affected by Congress and partisanship. There has historically been "a cycle or rhythm" in foreign policy-making, "fluctuating between presidential and congressional ascendance."[25] When Congress and the President are of different parties, two things can happen to foreign policy. If there is a strong difference of opinion, a paralysis can occur in American influence in foreign affairs, such as with Woodrow Wilson, a situation that eventually led to an isolationist foreign policy.[26] If the issue is important enough for the president to pursue bi-partisanship, the President will find himself at a disadvantage in negotiations with powerful senators, such as the situation with Harry S Truman and Senator Vandenburg, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.[27] The President is truly the master of foreign policy only if he is in unquestionable control of his party, and his party has the majority in Congress, especially in the Senate.[28]
In light of these requirements, then, one could say that George W. Bush indeed has full mastery of foreign affairs right now, and therefore should definitely take most if not all credit or opprobrium for the coming developments abroad. The theory alluded to earlier that presidential power in foreign affairs increases in times of crisis also applies now, even a year and a half after September 11. Thus all signs say that Bush has more power in foreign affairs today than perhaps any president in the history of the
The Economy
In contrast, the Constitution grants the President even less specific powers over the economy. The framers "clearly intended Congress to be the branch of government most concerned with the economic affairs of the nation," giving it, among other things, the power to: levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, pay debts, borrow money, regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states, coin money and regulate its value, and regulate the value of foreign currency.[32]
While presidents understood that promoting the nation's prosperity was important to their job, attempts to affect the actual performance of the economy through spending and taxing decisions per the theories of John Maynard Keynes didn't come until Franklin Delano Roosevelt's unprecedented New Deal government expenditures during the Great Depression of the 1930s,[33] and weren't universally accepted as part of presidential responsibility until Kennedy's landmark tax cuts in 1962. It was there that the "argument for fiscal management was won."[34]
However, such new presidential responsibility may have left an infuriating legacy for the likes of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George Bush, Sr., who shared the fate of Martin Van Buren and Herbert Hoover before them as presidents who were punished by voters for economic downturns during election years.[35] The fact of the matter is, with regards to the economy, the President will always be trapped in a "power gap" in which he has "important but severely limited" legal and administrative means to influence the economy's health and growth.[36] Despite high expectations of the American public and the President's primary role in economic policy-making, "the president's ability to influence economic conditions does not measure up to presidential responsibility for them."[37] Indeed, sitting in the center of the economic complex, they are expected to maintain prosperity and are criticized if it declines, even though what they can do about it is "hardly more than peripheral," more correctly called influence than power.[38] Economic experts also generally agree that the division of government with the most real power over the economy is the Federal Reserve Board, whose monetary powers of control are independent of the executive; while the Chairman of the Fed is often appointed by the President, he is by design not responsible to him.[39]
Yet presidents must maintain an aura of activity as well, working with the Department of the Treasury, his Council of Economic Advisers, Congress's Office of Management and Budget, and the Federal Reserve Board to constantly tweak taxation, spending, and the money supply in the hopes that if these efforts do not in actuality affect the economy, he will at least be perceived by voters as being concerned and doing the best he can. However, these efforts, scholars suggest, have served to merely perpetuate the "jagged prongs of a predicament" the President is always in, in which his "authority over the economy does not equal his responsibility for its condition."[40] As candidates, future presidents usually overstate and overestimate their ability to improve the economy in order to get elected.[41] It is thus partly their own fault that they are now expected to "steer" the economy, a gross misconception of what the economy is: "it's not a ship," but a figure of speech representing "a bunch of people engaged in production and trade."[42] The illusion of power is on both sides: candidates promise things they cannot control, and voters punish or reward for things that could not be controlled. Thus, as it is said, Americans will often "vote their pocket books," encouraging convoluted politics of fiscal and monetary policy that are "produced through an unwieldy political process of negotiation and compromise between the legislative and executive branches" instead of through sound consideration of "long-term and short-term needs of the country."[43]
So while the President lacks any real power over the economy, he does have several media through which he can at least provide some oblique influence and general guidelines to affect the overall pace of economic activity. The four main areas of influence are in stabilization and growth, regulations and control, direct services, and direct assistance.[44] The goals for stabilization and growth are to "maintain steady growth, high levels of employment, and price stability."[45] The methods of such have differed greatly over the last forty years. In the 1960s, great faith was put into fiscal policy, the manipulation of government revenues to influence the economy.[46] In the 1970s, stagflation killed that dream, and monetary policy grew prominent instead, controlling the nation's money supply through devices such as interest rates.[47] In the 1980s, Reaganomics, or supply-side economics was introduced, based on tax cuts to stimulate production rather than consumption.[48] In the 1990s, taxes slowly crept up again, reducing the budget and creating a surplus. Today, Bush has emulated Reagan's administration, passing a "pro-growth" tax cut in 2001.[49] Regulation and control often involve intensive legislation that the President can initiate. Fighting monopolies, protecting public health and the environment, and promoting competition and technological advancement are all ways the President can try to set general guidelines for the economy, though by no means of course controlling it outright.[50] Direct services run the gamut from defense spending to financing of public schools.[51] Direct assistance can involve low-interest loans, Social Security, and Medicare.[52] All these things were initiated and/or promoted somewhere along the line by American presidents.
Despite misplaced presidential accountability for the economy, this most recent economic downturn doesn't seem to be hurting Bush very much at all. Bush's rhetoric was very positive and optimistic early in his presidency, stating, "We've got a plan to get our economy moving so Americans can find work… I want the American people to know we're deeply concerned about the unemployment rates and we intend to do something about it."[53] And despite the continual fall of the economy since, a poll conducted by Fox News/Opinion Dynamics last year found that "only 5% of Americans say Bush is most responsible for the recession (tied with Bill Clinton and Congress)."[54] The top culprits in the poll were "economic cycles (36%)" and "the September 11 attacks, anthrax scares, and war in
Conclusion
It is probably safe to say that the President of the
God bless
[1] Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from
[2] Orman, John. Presidential Accountability: New and Recurring Problems.
[3] Waterman, Richard W., Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, and Carol L. Silva. "The Expectations Gap Thesis: Public Attitudes toward an Incumbent President." The Journal of Politics 61.4 (1999): 945.
[5] Peterson, Paul E. "The President's Dominance in Foreign Policy Making." Political Science Quarterly 109.2 (1994): 220.
[6] Laski, Harold J. "The American President and Foreign Relations." The Journal of Politics 11.1 (1949): 171.
[7] Grimmett, Richard F. "Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress." Bureau of Public Affairs.
[13] Tugwell, Rexford G. "The President and His Helpers: A Review-Article." Political Science Quarterly 82.2 (1967): 260.
[14] Kennedy, John F. "The Leader of the Free World." Address.
[15] "Foreign Affairs of the
[17] Diller, Daniel C. "Chief Diplomat." Powers of the Presidency. Eds. Margaret Seawell Benjaminson, Michael Nelson, and John L. Moore.
[30] Perl, Raphael F. "Terrorism, the Future, and
[32] Diller, Daniel C., and Dean J. Peterson. "Chief Economist." Powers of the Presidency. Eds. Margaret Seawell Benjaminson, Michael Nelson, and John L. Moore.
[42] Richman, Sheldon. "No One Is Qualified." Freedom Daily. Dec. 2000. The Future of Freedom Foundation.
[44] "How the
[49] Cheney, Richard. Address, Conservative Political Action Conference.
[53] Bush, George W. "President Voices Concern Over Economy." Address, Outside the Oval Office.
[54] Dunham, Richard S. "A Bum Economy Is No Boost for Dems." BusinessWeek Online
No comments:
Post a Comment